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S/24536
9 September 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 8 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to our letter dated 3 September 1992 (S/24515), I have the honour to communicate to you hereunder additional details of the outrage mentioned in paragraph 6 of the aforesaid letter.

A series of outrages has recently taken place against Iraqi farms situated south of the Safwan line, and they have focused in particular on the farm of the Iraqi national Jaber Farhan Khafian. We informed you of these outrages in our letters of 5 July, 23 July and 5 August 1992. On reviewing the whole series, we note that there has been a deliberate escalation in the outrages committed. The most recent is the incident in question which, further to the information we provided in paragraph 6 of our letter of 2 September 1992, led to the injury of a UNIKOM observer who was present and sustained a bullet wound in the leg while watching the incident unfold.

UNIKOM carried out an investigation of the incident on 1 September 1992, forming for that purpose two teams. In the course of the inquiry, the observers questioned the farmers Jaber Khafian, Jasim Bajay Khashshan and Alwan Udhayr Kannin, who described how members of the Kuwait police had approached the farm of the citizen Jaber Khafian, struck his son and tried to tow away his private vehicle and confiscate it. The farmers also described to the UNIKOM investigation team the series of outrages against their farms.

It should also be mentioned that, at 1510 hours, less than half an hour after the incident referred to, fighter aircraft violated Iraq's airspace and flew over the place at which the incident had taken place.

My Government, in calling your attention to the deliberate escalation in the outrages to which I have referred, protests in the strongest terms against these open assaults on Iraq's sovereignty and security and the safety of its citizens and holds the assailants fully responsible for the consequences of such assaults.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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9 September 1992

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LETTER DATED 5 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Acting under paragraph 5 of the resolution 771 (13 August 1992) where the Security Council "calls upon States ... to collate substantiated information in their possession or submitted to them relating to the violations of humanitarian law, including grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, being committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and to make this information available to the Council"; and further,

Acting under the President's statement of 4 August (S/PV.3103) where the Security Council "... calls upon all parties, States, ... to make immediately available to the Council any further information they might possess regarding these camps and access to them";

I have the honour to present to you the attached report "Camps: No Rules for Deaths," published by the Vreme News Digest Agency on 17 August 1992. Vreme is a highly regarded Belgrade, Serbia, weekly.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the report as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and Permanent
Representative

Annex

No Rules for Deaths

The camp at Manjaca has already become known, while fresh data pertain to Bosanski Novi where civilians, all of them, women included, have had their hairs shaven. Serbian regulars and irregulars are torturing the civilians they round up from villages near Bosanski Novi. They take the "prisoners" in buses, torturing them on the way. Recently, only 5 out of 50 villagers from around Bosanski Novi had reached the camp, for others were killed and massacred along the way.

Moslem and Croat population in Banja Luka is maltreated. In Kozarac near Prijedor, all houses, with people, were burned down, and charred bodies lie along the street. Moslem and Croats flee Prijedor illegally unless they have paid 10,000 DEM to some of the local Serbs. The Serbs caught in helping Croats and Moslems are punished by the "true" Serbs in the same way. They are arrested in the same camps. In Banja Luka, Moslem-owned shops have almost invariably been blown up. Those that have not, stay closed, because their owners are threatened constantly.

Moslems and Croats have been removed from all major offices in the army of the "Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina". For having uttered a wrong word, people are taken away or killed. A curfew closes at 9 a.m., electric power is cut off throughout most of the day, a state-of-war-threat is proclaimed, and all Serbs aged up to 65 years are mobilized.

The mobilized men from the area of Banja Luka municipality are engaged in war around Doboj and Odzak, where they mop up the field, which presumes the extermination of Moslems and other non-Serbs in the localities nearby.

Travelling from Banja Luka to Belgrade, one passes a multitude of predominately para-military checkpoints. The most essential is the name and surname as stated in personal identity papers, while the usual question is: "Any Turks here?". If a Moslem happens to be here, this is the end for his journey: he is dragged out from the vehicle and liquidated on the spot.

Certain predominantly Moslem-populated places in the vicinity of Banja Luka, towards Prijedor, Derventa and Doboj, exist now only as names on maps.

The military communication line Banjaluka-Belgrade is very busy. Every weekend, trucks driven by Banjaluka reservists arrive carrying arms from barracks in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The entire operation is organized through the command of Banjaluka garrison, which receives also arms also with the assistance of Serbian forces from Pale (near Sarajevo).

One of the latest shipments of munitions to Banjaluka weighed one thousand tonnes of ammunition.

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LETTER DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to present to you the attached letter, dated 8 September 1992, from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, H.E. Mr. Alija Izetbegovic.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating the letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Ambassador and
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 8 September 1992 from the President of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed to the President of the Security Council

The right to personal dignity, work, housing, freedom of expression and freedom of religion are basic entitlements of every citizen. The right to life is fundamental.

The inviolability of frontiers is meaningless if murder runs riot within. The aspirations, declarations and undertakings made in London are valueless without the means to hold to account those who deliberately break their solemn word. It is essential to produce evidence which will convince not just the Governments and international institutions, but the citizens of the world, of the need for concerted and sustained action against such transgressors.

The means are at hand.

Remote satellite sensing, fixed wing and rotary aircraft, can all, with suitable equipment, provide incontrovertible evidence in meticulous detail of the topography of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina and adjacent territories. It is a sine qua non of military planning to engage in the maximum possible reconnaissance prior to any activity. It seems reasonable to suggest that the combined forces of NATO have not overlooked this principle.

The specific points detailed under the headings Cessation of Violence, Confidence Building Measures, Humanitarian Issues, Refugees and Detention Camps, Safe Areas, Sanctions and Violations of International Humanitarian Law, all require the ability to those endeavouring to implement these objectives to have the means at hand to produce all pertinent detail in such a manner as to preclude denial, equivocation and procrastination over legitimate demands for physical inspection.

Aerial surveys are a non-confrontational means of assisting all parties in this essential and urgent work. The methods available are all-weather and 24 hours in capacity. They can be conducted by civilian personnel in suitably identified aircraft. Any party to the London Conference declarations, which seeks to oppose the introduction of such technology must have much to hide from scrutiny of the world.

The Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina formally requests that the joint United Nations-European Community working group immediately take all appropriate measures designed to implement this proposal without delay.

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIC

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9 September 1992

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3113th meeting, on 9 September 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina":

"The Security Council has noted with deep concern the attack which cost the lives of two French soldiers of UNPROFOR near Sarajevo, during which five other soldiers were wounded. It conveys its deep-felt sympathy and condolences to the Government of France and to the bereaved families. It strongly condemns this deliberate attack against UNPROFOR personnel.

"The Council invites the Secretary-General to inform it as soon as possible on the findings of the inquiry into the circumstances of this attack as well as other similar incidents involving the United Nations activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in particular the incident which cost the lives of four Italian airmen in charge of the transportation of humanitarian relief to Sarajevo Airport. It invites him also to pass on to it any information which he could gather on the responsibility for these incidents.

"These serious incidents underline the urgent need for reinforcing the security and protection of UNPROFOR personnel as well as of all personnel involved in the United Nations activities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Security Council expresses its readiness to adopt without delay measures to this end."

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10 September 1992

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE SITUATION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

INTRODUCTION

1. Following the adoption of resolution 770 (1992) on 13 August 1992, a number of the co-sponsors of that resolution communicated to me views about how the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina could be facilitated through the provision of protective support by the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). In essence, their view was that this function could be added to UNPROFOR's mandate and carried out by military personnel, under the command of the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, operating in accordance with the established principles and practices of United Nations peace-keeping operations. Some of the Member States concerned indicated that they were ready to provide the necessary military personnel, equipment and logistic support at no cost to the United Nations.

2. I welcomed this approach, especially as regards its financial aspects, and instructed my staff to discuss it in greater detail with the Member States concerned, with a view to formulating proposals which I could present to the Security Council. The present report contains such proposals.

I. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

3. These proposals, which have been discussed with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and enjoy her support, recognize UNHCR's role as the lead agency for humanitarian activities in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR's task, under its enlarged mandate, would be to support UNHCR's efforts to deliver humanitarian relief throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and in particular to provide protection, at UNHCR's request, where and when UNHCR considered such protection necessary.

4. It would remain UNHCR's responsibility, as at present, to determine the priorities and schedules for the delivery of such relief, to organize the relief convoys, to negotiate safe passage along the intended routes, with UNPROFOR's assistance as required, and to coordinate requests from non-governmental organizations and other agencies wishing to join UNPROFOR-protected convoys. UNHCR, after consulting UNPROFOR, would decide which convoys needed protection, and protection would be provided only at UNHCR's request. Other humanitarian agencies seeking UNPROFOR's protection for their deliveries of relief supplies would have to address their requests to UNHCR.

5. UNHCR would establish regional storage and distribution centres at 11 locations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as follows:

(a) With access from Croatia: Banja Luka, Bihac, Mostar, Sarajevo, Vitez;

(b) With access from Serbia/Montenegro: Bilece, Foca, Gorazde, Vlasenica;

(c) With access from both: Doboj, Tuzla.

6. UNPROFOR would, when so requested by UNHCR, provide protection of convoys to UNHCR's regional centres and from them to local distribution points. UNPROFOR would also assume responsibility for the protection of United Nations facilities, including UNHCR storage centres, if so requested by UNHCR.

7. The military elements added to UNPROFOR would include a transport battalion which would be at the disposal of UNHCR for the delivery of relief supplies along routes determined by UNHCR, after consultation with UNPROFOR, to be particularly difficult. In other cases, UNHCR trucks with civilian drivers would constitute the convoy but would be escorted by UNPROFOR military vehicles and personnel.

8. Operational decisions relating to a protected convoy, including action to be taken in the event that the convoy encountered obstacles, would be the responsibility of the commander of the UNPROFOR escort, who would, where possible, consult the senior UNHCR representative in the convoy before taking such decisions. The relationship between UNPROFOR and UNHCR would be comparable to that developed for the Sarajevo airport operation.

9. In providing protective support to UNHCR-organized convoys, the UNPROFOR troops concerned would follow normal peace-keeping rules of engagement. They would thus be authorized to use force in self-defence. It is to be noted that, in this context, self-defence is deemed to include situations in which armed persons attempt by force to prevent United Nations troops from carrying out their mandate. These considerations are particularly relevant in the current tense situation in the proposed area of operations. The Security Council's approval of the recommendations contained in this report would mean that the number of troops and other UNPROFOR personnel deployed in Bosnia and

Herzegovina would be increased by a factor of four or five. It is therefore essential that all parties uphold the undertakings they have made and cease forthwith their attacks on United Nations personnel and property. Should this not occur, the Security Council would have to consider what further steps might be necessary to ensure UNPROFOR's security and enable it to fulfil its mandate.

10. It is envisaged that UNHCR's expanded programme of humanitarian relief deliveries, with UNPROFOR's protection as required, would deliver some 5,000 tonnes a week to those in need in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11. Following the agreement at the London International Conference on the unconditional and unilateral release, under international supervision, of all civilians detained in detention camps, the question has arisen of the security of those who would be released. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has expressed concern at the risks to which those detainees who wished to leave Bosnia and Herzegovina might be exposed while being taken from the camps and detention centres to places of refuge in neighbouring countries. UNPROFOR does not at present have the resources in Bosnia and Herzegovina to undertake the protection of such persons except on a very limited basis. However, should the Security Council decide to expand the mandate and strength of UNPROFOR as recommended in this report, the additional resources provided to it could also be used to protect convoys of released detainees if the ICRC so requested and if the Force Commander agreed that the request was practicable. In taking action on this report, the Council may wish to authorize UNPROFOR to undertake this function.

II. STRUCTURE OF THE OPERATION

12. Overall command and control of the operation would be exercised by the Force Commander of UNPROFOR. A new Bosnia and Herzegovina Command would be established within UNPROFOR at the two-star level, with its headquarters at Sarajevo. This Command would assume responsibility for all peace-keeping operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, i.e. the current operation at Sarajevo airport, the protective support of humanitarian convoys and of released detainees, the work of United Nations military observers deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the original UNPROFOR mandate (currently only at Bihac) and the supervision of the parties' heavy weapons, should the Security Council assign this further task to UNPROFOR.

13. UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command would consist of:

(a) Sector Sarajevo, commanded as at present at the one-star level, to continue performing the tasks arising from the 5 June agreement and authorized by resolutions 758 (1992) and 761 (1992);

(b) Four or five new zones, the precise locations of which would be determined after further consultation with UNHCR. Possible centres for them include Banja Luka, Bihac, Doboj, Gorazde, Mostar, Tuzla and Vitez. In each

zone there would be an infantry battalion group, whose headquarters would also need to include civilian staff to undertake political and information functions and liaison with UNHCR. It is envisaged that approximately 20 international Professional staff, 18 General Service and 10 local staff would be required for these functions, with an additional 20 international civil administration personnel and 12 local staff for administrative support tasks. (The possibility of a small reduction in these numbers will also be studied by the advance party proposed in paragraph 16 below.)

14. The UNPROFOR units in the new zones would need to have a high degree of self-sufficiency, possessing their own front-line and second-line logistic capacity, subject to decisions by the planning party on what logistic support they could obtain from UNPROFOR's existing logistic structures. In addition, UNPROFOR's Bosnia and Herzegovina Command would need an engineer bridging company, medical evacuation capability and an integral communications unit. A total of 80 additional United Nations military observers would also be required for patrolling, liaison, negotiation and ad hoc humanitarian tasks.

15. To summarize the above requirements, UNPROFOR would need to be augmented by the following, in addition to its present strength in Sarajevo:

(a) Four or five infantry battalion groups, each including a headquarters and a headquarters company, two armoured reconnaissance companies, two armoured infantry companies, an engineer sub-unit for route and mine clearance and ordnance disposal and logistic capability as described above;

(b) A transport battalion of some 500 all ranks with 100 trucks and an adequate maintenance capacity;

(c) A medical evacuation capability;

(d) An engineer bridging company;

(e) A signals unit for communications within and between the zones and headquarters;

(f) Eighty United Nations military observers;

(g) Approximately 80 civilian staff members.

16. As soon as the Security Council has taken action on this report, I shall ask the Member States contributing additional elements to UNPROFOR to form a joint planning team. This team will proceed to Zagreb and finalize, in consultation with the Force Commander and his staff and with representatives of UNHCR, plans for implementing the concept described in this report, especially as regards the deployment of the additional elements and their logistic support.

III. FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS

17. In consultations with Member States who have expressed an interest in contributing military personnel, equipment and logistic support to UNPROFOR for this operation, I have made it clear that my recommendation to the Security Council for UNPROFOR's mandate to be enlarged in this way would be based on the assumption that all such resources would be provided at no cost to the United Nations and that the contributing countries, or other Member States on a voluntary basis, would cover the additional administrative expenses which would be incurred by the United Nations. It would be necessary to confirm that sufficient funds were available from these sources before the additional troops could be put in place.

IV. OBSERVATIONS

18. The concept described in this report seems to me to provide the best possibility for ensuring increased deliveries of humanitarian relief to the suffering people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It would assure the Security Council's control of the operation, while at the same time avoiding the imposition of additional financial burdens on the Organization. I therefore recommend that the Security Council approve the expansion of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength, on the basis of the plan described above, to provide protective support for UNHCR-organized humanitarian convoys throughout the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

After the consultations held on 10 September 1992, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the media on behalf of the Council:

"The members of the Security Council deplore the killing of 28 demonstrators and the wounding of nearly 200 others by security elements in South Africa on 7 September 1992. They reiterate their grave concern at the continued escalation of the violence in South Africa. They emphasize once again the responsibility of the South African authorities for the maintenance of law and order and call on them to take all measures to end the violence and to protect the right of all South Africans to engage in peaceful political activity without fear of intimidation or violence. They urge all parties in South Africa to cooperate in combating violence and to exercise maximum restraint in order to help break the spiralling cycle of violence.

"The members of the Security Council emphasize the need to put an end to the violence and create conditions for negotiations leading to the establishment of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa. They note in this regard that the Security Council, in its resolution 772 (1992) of 17 August 1992, authorized the Secretary-General to deploy United Nations observers in South Africa, in coordination with the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, to provide a framework and basis for putting an end to violence in the country. They welcome the Secretary-General's decision to deploy an advance party of 13 United Nations observers in South Africa on 11 September 1992 as part of the complement of 50 observers to be deployed within one month.

"The members of the Council call upon the Government of South Africa, parties and organizations, and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord, to extend their full cooperation to the United Nations observers to enable them to carry out their tasks effectively. They reiterate their call to other relevant regional and

intergovernmental organizations to consider deploying their own observers in South Africa in coordination with the United Nations and the structures set up under the National Peace Accord in order to facilitate the peace process."

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

After the consultations held on 10 September 1992, the President of the Security Council made the following statement to the media on behalf of the Council:

"The members of the Security Council having heard the information provided by the Secretary-General and having considered the Final document of the Moscow meeting between the President of the Russian Federation and the Chairman of the State Council of the Republic of Georgia on 3 September 1992, express their satisfaction with the efforts of the participants of the meeting aimed at achieving an immediate cease-fire, overcoming the crisis situation and creating conditions for a comprehensive political settlement in Abkhazia which had become an area of armed conflict.

The members of the Council, stressing the urgent necessity for a political settlement of the conflict by peaceful means, through negotiations, reaffirm the inadmissibility of any encroachment upon the principle of territorial integrity and upon Georgia's internationally recognized borders, and the necessity of respecting the rights of all people of all ethnic groups in the region. They welcome the resumption of the normal functioning of the legitimate authorities in Abkhazia.

In this connection the members of the Council welcome the principles of the settlement contained in the above-mentioned Final document and commend concrete measures aimed at the settlement in Abkhazia envisaged in it. They call upon all the parties in the conflict and all others concerned to observe strictly the agreements achieved in Moscow.

The members of the Council take note of the intention of the Secretary-General to send a goodwill mission and request him to inform the Council periodically of the developments in Abkhazia."

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